Fall Seminars

  The past months have been filled with new opportunities for the “Equipping for Service” educational program for which I am responsible. The core idea of the “Equipping...” project remains the same – “to maximize accessibility to quality educational opportunities in the Evangelical Lutheran Church through a program that is collaboratively planned, flexible, and decentralized,” but in marked contrast to the events of the first part of the year, recently I've been engaged not only in teaching, but also in organizing events.

  The first of these came together at the last minute – “Two Issues in Christian Ethics,” held

in the congregation in Krasnoyarsk. This is an active congregation that values educational opportunities, so I knew that it was possible to try an experiment there - we would talk about Christian ethics. In a society that leans towards either a legalistic or a nihilistic approach to ethical questions, Lutherans sometimes would prefer to avoid the question altogether. But given the conflict between Russia and its neighbors and the influx of refugees from Donbas that have come even to Siberia, it seemed important to me to help our congregational members use their faith to engage these questions. While I hoped to look at the question of "Peace and War," in our two evenings together we only had time to look at the more general question of whom we help and why, which lead us in to the underlying question of how we go about moral decision making in as Christians. The two evenings brought together a total of 24 participants, which I consider to be quite successful given that people needed to take public transport to the church after work in order to attend. I was also very pleased to see congregational members interested in applying their faith to concrete ethical and social questions that surround them. I plan on doing more work in this sphere.

  The second event was south of Krasnoyarsk, in the region of Khakasia.  The region has 10 congregations spread over a 150 mile radius; most of them get only monthly visits from their pastor, Dmitry Schweitz, who was instrumental in helping organize this retreat, which we called "I am a Servant." The

main idea was to support the team of people leading congregations on a week to week basis. We hoped to reach this goal both through fellowship and through thinking about the following questions together - “What does it mean to serve? When do I feel like a servant? How can one serve effectively?” In the process we talked about the way service is understood in society and in the Bible, Jesus as a model of service, love at the center of Christian service, the Lutheran understanding of internal and external call, and our communal call as the church in this place. A number of concrete ideas were raised that the leaders intend to bring to realization – e.g., fund-raisers to help those in acute need, printing fliers about Lutheranism for distribution, and a cooperative attempt to form a new youth group in one of the congregations.  

  And this last month I was very pleased to welcome Pastor Chris Repp back to Russia.Chris had been my mentor when I came to Russia at as a seminary intern in 2001. About 2 years later, he passed on to me the position of teacher of Church History, Systematics and Ethics at the Novosaratovka Theological Seminary. When the opportunity arose to invite him for participation in an academic conference co-organized by the church, we decided that it would be great if he could also have contact with others through the “Equipping...” program. Chris and I chose to lead two 3-day seminars, one in Omsk (Siberia) and one in Ulyanovsk (in European Russia on the Volga). We thought that the title, “Law, Gospel and the Lutheran Confessions Today,” would attract mostly pastors and students. We did have participants from these groups, but it turns out that the topic had wider appeal than we might have expected. In Omsk there were 9 full participants (along with 7 others who were in and out) and in Ulyanovsk a week later we had a very large number – always more than 20, and most of the time around 30. Although the theme of the seminar was the same, Chris and I had to seriously adapt our material to the different audiences we saw, but in both cases I believe that the time we spent together was meaningful. 

  In Omsk the main thrust of my teaching was to help participants see that we do have official confessional documents, though we are far from familiar with their contents and that we need to familiarize ourselves with them in order to decide for ourselves what role(s) they are to play in the life of our church. Chris Repp focused on the issue of Law and Gospel as address in the Augsburg Confession and the Apology, demonstrating why this was important and how it applies to the interpretation of Biblical texts. (In this he has been influenced by the theological approach of the Crossings Community). In Omsk Seminary President Anton Tikhomirov was also with us and he first spoke about the confessions as a textual expression of Luther's Reformation break-through and then traced the development of Western (especially Protestant) theology from that time forward. In Ulyanovsk we kept things simpler, giving the most attention to the uses of the law and Biblical interpretation. In both places local leaders (a special thanks to Tatyana Muramtseva in Omsk and Vladimir Provorov in Ulyanovsk) did an excellent job of solving logistical issues.

Seminary participants in Omsk. Seminary President Anton Tikhomirov is 2nd from left; Chris Repp far right.

Seminary participants in Ulyanovsk. Pastor Vladimir Provorov (red, center) was our host. 

  Many thanks to you for your prayers and support (through the Hermannsburg Mission and the ELCA.) If any of you or your congregations are interested in making a special gift to help cover the expenses related to the “Equipping...” project, you can learn more about that through the ELCA's “Always Being Made New” initiative.

Ecclesia semper reformanda est - an article in Russian

In honor of Reformation Day, I've decided to post a only-slightly-modified version of the article I wrote for an issue of "Der Bote" magazine last year. If you read Russian and would like to give me critical feedback, I'd be happy to be in conversation with you! And if you can't read Russian, just tell me what a wonderful article it was. :)

* * * 

Классическое богословие, ссылаясь на разум и Писание (например Иак 1.17), утверждает, что Бог «неизменяемый». Но сотворенный Им мир не разделяет с Ним это свойство. Темп изменений в нашем веке технологий и потребления очень высок. Нам не просто справляться со этой нестабильностью; мы стремимся к Богу и Его Постоянству. Поэтому некоторые считают, что Церковь, в отличие от всего остального в мире, не изменяется. За эту опору они держатся. Но такое понятие Церкви не имеет твердого богословского обоснования. Как говорится, только пьяный человек думает, что столб уличного освещения стоит при дороге для того, чтобы за него держаться. Трезвый человек знает, что он там, чтобы лучше видеть дорогу.

Будучи в Церкви, мы находимся в дороге: как и весь мир, мы пребываем в движении. Это известно давно, и именно об этом говорит известная богословская формулировка ecclesia semper reformanda est («Церковь всегда реформируется»). Она существует в разных вариантах. Например, более полный вариант звучит так: ecclesia reformata, semper

reformanda secundum verbi dei. То есть реформированная Церковь всегда должна находиться в процесс реформирования в соответствии со Словом Божьим. Эта формулировка часто приписывается Мартину Лютеру, но имеет более позднее происхождение (XVII в., Нидерланды). На сегодняшний день даже в Римско-Католической Церкви говорят: «история подтверждает, что Церковь всегда принимала так называемый кальвиновский принцип постоянного реформирования, хотя она опасалась применить его либо слишком радикально, либо слишком поверхностно» (Catholic Encyclopedia. “Reformation, Theological Basis.”).

Причина экуменического признания этой фразы — осознание наличия постоянных изменении в церкви в ходе истории. Если задуматься, то ни первое, ни пятнадцатое,ни какое-либо другое столетие нельзя назвать «золотым веком» Церкви, отличающимся идеальной моралью и полной ясностью в христианском учении. Конечно, многие центральные утверждения вероучения остались непоколебимыми. Но, в тоже время, в глаза бросается множество перемен. В этике оставались неизменными общие направления («люби ближнего»), в то время как более детальные нормы (например, отношение к рабству) менялись. В зависимости от эпохи те или иные этические проблемы занимали различные позиции, находясь в центре внимания или же отодвигаясь на второй план.

Что касается вероучения, здесь четко прослеживается развитие: от первых веков существования Церкви (когда только сформировались такие ключевые моменты, как канон новозаветного Писания и учения о Троице) через Средневековье (когда развивались, например, учение о благодати и учение о Причастии) и до наших дней (когда христианское вероучение должно реагировать на бурно развивающиеся научные представления о мироздании, о человеческом организме и т.д.).

Мысль о том, что даже Церковь не является оплотом стабильности, может сильно разочаровать многих. Не исключение здесь и лютеране, ведь мы не менее других христиан подвержены искушению делать из того или иного периода церковной истории «золотой век», нормам которого мы должны соответствовать. Но не стоит расстраиваться. Меняется всё земное. Евангелист Лука показывает нам, что жизнь Иисуса не является здесь исключением: Иисус «возрастал и укреплялся духом, исполняясь премудрости, и благодать Божия была на Нем» (Лк. 2,40). Оставаясь Богочеловеком, Иисус претерпевал изменения. Мы в Церкви должны быть вдохновлены этим примером: развиваясь, мы не перестаем быть телом Христовым. Наоборот, если мы как тело не развиваемся, остается единственная альтернатива – умереть.

Если реформация естественна и необходима для Церкви, возникает проблема: как мы можем понять, какие изменения нужны и какие, наоборот, поставили бы под вопрос всю нашу христианскую веру? Ведь существует опасность «реформироваться» настолько, что можно вообще выйти за рамки христианства (например, как мормоны или свидетели Иеговы). Христианская община сталкивается с этой проблемой с самого начала своего существования. Мы видим это в пятой главе Деяний апостолов, где Гамалиил дает очень полезный совет синедриону относительно нового течения в иудаизме (именно так христианство воспринималось в начале): «если это предприятие... – от человеков, то оно разрушится, а если от Бога, то вы не можете разрушить его; берегитесь, чтобы вам не оказаться и богопротивниками». (Деян. 5,38-39). Также в посланиях мы видим, что не всегда было легко сохранить самое ценное (1 Тим. 6,20), не лишаясь при этом нового – того, что Бог хочет видеть среди верующих (1 Фес. 5,19-21).

Здесь нам поможет данное Ярославом Пеликаном определение: «традиция – это живая вера мертвых, традиционализм является мертвой верой живых. Традиция живет в общении с прошлым, не забывая при этом, где мы находимся и живем сейчас, и что мы – это те, кто должен принимать решение. Традиционализм исходит из того, что нельзя попробовать что либо впервые, считает, что решение любой проблемы можно найти в якобы единогласном свидетельстве однородной традиции» (The Vindication of Tradition). Другими словами, мы не должны делать идола из своего прошлого, но сохранение его ценностей является необходимым для правильной реформации в настоящем. Главное – неустанно спрашивать себя: как наши слова и действия сочетаются с Благой вестью о любви Бога к нам через Иисуса Христа? Евангелие – вот наше мерило. И нам следует применять Его ко всем аспектам нашей церковной жизни – от диаконического служения и регулярности принятия Причастия до музыки и вопросов управления.

Это значит, что нам надо быть готовыми говорить и действовать не «по накатанному», отказаться от своих привычек. Конечно, Церковь – не товар, который мы продаем миру, – «теперь в новой упаковке!», а реформация – не рекламный подход. Речь идет о настоящем

духовном обновлении, поэтому ради проповеди Евангелия придется, быть может, пожертвовать чем-то нам дорогим. Ведь всегда есть риск, что Церковь может «забыть о своей первичной функции, о служении. Она может развивать пассивность, монотонность, механичность. Церковь способна начать понимать себя... как явление тех обетований, которые она сохраняет». Реформация – это «постоянное обращение, которое... позволяет Церкви оставить поиск собственной славы». (Leonardo Boff. Church, Charism and Power). Только через постоянный процесс обращения Церковь может соответствовать своему призванию.

Безусловно, невозможно совершить реформацию только собственными силами. Поэтому мы молимся об обновлении Церкви Духом Святым, чтобы мы в Теле Христовом «возрастали и укреплялись духом, исполняясь премудрости». Используя критический подход ко всему, что мы делаем, мы ощутим, что «благодать Божья» сопровождает нас на пути. И тогда станет очевидно: хорошо, что ecclesia semper reformanda est, ведь и мир тоже меняется.

News from the General Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Russia

In my days (Sept 17-19) spent as a non-voting delegate at the General Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Russia, the church in which I serve, I was struck by two themes - peacemaking and mission. 

Bishop Alfred Eichholz from Kyrgyzstan, representing the Union of Evangelical Lutheran Churches (i.e., the association of Lutheran church bodies in most of the states of the former Soviet Union), spoke about peacemaking during the sermon at opening worship. Bishop Eicholz chose a timely theme, since all of us continue to be greatly concerned about the situation in Ukraine. It would not have been possible, I think, to find one common position among even the small number of delegates that attend the synod assembly, but it was at very least helpful to be reminded that as those who have been reconciled with God through Christ, we are to be engaged in the ministry of reconciliation. 

This was not unrelated, of course, to the theme of mission, which we spoke about more explicitly later in the day. Particularly important in this regard was the paper presented by the General Secretary of the Lutheran World Federation, Martin Junge. Dr. Junge gave a lecture that challenged synod delegates to think hard about the goals and limits of mission. Initial discussion seemed to indicate that there is a need to integrate at a deeper level that mission is not something we do, but that God does, not something that is one task of the church among many, but that in everything we do we would be seeking to work together with God to make God's love manifest.

A slide from Bishop Brauer's presentation on how
he imagined what our church could look like.

Such an understanding of mission, if I understand correctly, is held by Dietrich Brauer, my former student at the Novosaratovka seminary, Bishop of European Russia and recently the "Acting Archbishop" of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Russia. Electing Bishop Brauer as Archbishop (without the limited time frame and scope of responsibilities that the word "Acting" suggested) will help this church go forward in a way that puts the theme of mission squarely in front of the whole church.  It was after hearing his report (not so much about the work that has been done as about his proposals for a common vision of our identity and call) that I realized that our church is making slow but significant steps forward, coming into its own, even as many long-term challenges remain with us for the time being. 

My responsibility at this synod was to speak about one of the ways we are addressing the church's long-term needs - education. I presented an initial report on my experience this year as the leader of the "Equipping for Service" project, an attempt to address the need for education in the church by organizing events (retreats, seminars, etc.) throughout this vast land. I've been blessed to have the opportunity to run this program so far, and am thankful for all of those (including some that might be reading this blog) who have helped support it.

My official commissioning as head of the "Equipping...." project.

Synod delegates, staff and guests

I will conclude this post by including here the note I wrote to Bishop Brauer on the day after his election as Archbishop. More than anything else it summarizes my feelings about the General Synod and my hopes for this church's future. 

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Dear Bishop Brauer,

As a rule I usually feel quite awkward about either receiving or giving congratulations in the context of ministry in the church. It doesn't fit, somehow – after all, we acknowledge that our achievements here are not our own. We believe that successful ministry happens because in God's great mercy we have been provided with what is necessary to bring about that success – the right circumstances, the appropriate gifts, the proper skills, education, and character. Whether dealing with difficult situations or finding ways to take full advantage of new opportunities, we trust that the Spirit is guiding us. In moments like this, then, when we see before us a concrete manifestation of grace, my first reaction is to be thankful.

So instead of congratulating you, dear brother Dietrich, with your election as Archbishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Russia, I would like instead simply to express my feeling of deep gratitude to God for providing you and others to help lead this church as it seeks to share the gift of Christ's love for a hurting world.

My thanks also goes out to you, personally. You have been a faithful steward of gifts that you have been given, setting an example (perhaps it is even appropriate to speak of a standard) of excellence in ministry. Your compassion, commitment, energy and vision for mission have already had a significant impact on the church here, and I consider it a privilege to have the opportunity to continue the journey of ministry together.

Yours in Christ,

Bradn

  

Sanctions and Hope

It is an interesting and strange time to be living in Russia. While the country has changed much over my dozen years here, much of what has happened over the last weeks and months has surprised me a great deal. Many of the changes we have seen could be considered progress. For example while there was a time when it was difficult to find a good Internet connection, lately you could find free wifi in St. Petersburg's center; as of last

Our last jar of p.b.

week, though, in order to log on to that free network you'll need to provide your passport information. Another example - years ago I would have never imagined that you'd be able to easily find (American) peanut butter and marshmallows on the shelves...but even less would I have imagined a time when those items would disappear from store shelves (together with a number of other things our family enjoys, from Finnish cheese to Spanish oranges) as a result of Russia's answer to Western sanctions. A different selection in the supermarket is no big deal, of course; more significant is the change in atmosphere caused by this current conflict. Once again Russia has become a place for me that is not always predictable, and that's not always comfortable.... 

And as soon as that thought comes in to my head, I am reminded that being comfortable never was the goal. The goal was to be with the people, to both hear and share about our faith, whatever the circumstances. That means that it is particularly important for me at this time to stick with the country and with the small minority which is the Lutheran church here.

It can be challenging to continue the journey filled with hope. In fact much of the time I distrust even positive signs (e.g., those coming out of Ukraine right now?) and most of the time I feel powerless to bring about positive change. Thinking about the wider world (Iraq and Syria, Gaza and Ebola) can bring one right up to the edge of despair. 

Spending time together with Russian Christians has helped me find my center again. Over the past two weeks I have had the opportunity to teach at a seminar for our church entitled “Introduction to the Spiritual Life.” 14 participants from around European Russia have listened to me as I've taught about Christian spiritual practices, healthy congregations, a short history of Christian monasticism, and one of the writers that has most influenced me, Thomas Merton. (Finally, almost 15 years after taking a course on him in seminary I had an excuse to share my interest in Merton with sisters and brothers here!) Along the way they've shared with me their own thoughts about the church, theology and their own spiritual life. It was here, in and outside of the classroom, that hope was reborn, hope that by turning to central relationship of our faith, by seeking to affect positive change in the world from inside out, believers really can make a difference. Another way of putting this is to say that instead of concentrating on acting like a Christian, this course has reminded me that these efforts are likely to do little good (not to mention likely to burn us out) without inner transformation and renewal. 

Whatever direction Russia takes in the future, I know for certain now that hope will never be on a list of banned imports. There is no reason to import, after all, for God's renewing Spirit is at work here, bringing about positive change in the lives of individuals and, through them, in wider society.  

Participants from Ivangorod, Moscow and Yaroslavl. More pictures to come...

Patriarch Sergei and the church in the Russian context

  I was recently asked to give a paper in Germany to a group of friends and partners of the Lutheran church in the former Soviet Union. There was the desire from the group that I speak about Orthodoxy a bit in order to come to a fuller understanding of the post-Soviet context. I prepared this text as an oral presentation, which means I didn't follow in this text academic standards for citations; the text is also quite long. Perhaps, though, it also might be useful to those of you who are interested in learning more about the history and contemporary situation in the church in Russia. It also might give a bit of insight into the churches' actions (or lack of action) when various controversies arise.
* * *
  We all know the tragic story of the repression of religion in the former Soviet Union, but what we might not always think about is the wide variety of ways this traumatic experience affects the life of the church today. To be more precise, we know of the destruction of church buildings and structures and the execution of tens or even hundreds of thousands of people based on their faith. But there is another aspect, too, I would call it the “moral” aspect, that remains in the background even as the church in many other aspects is restored. Taking a look at the life and ministry of Sergei (born Ivan) Stragorodsky will help us come to a fuller understanding of what the church went through and some of the problems it faces today. 
  I'd like to begin with a quote from Sergei's "Declaration of Loyalty" from 1927

We want to be Orthodox, and at the same time to see the Soviet Union as our civic Fatherland, whose triumphs and successes are also our triumphs and successes, whose failures are our failures. Every attack against the Union whether it be war, boycott or any other public affliction...  will be regarded as an attack against ourselves.

  These may seem like very strange words from a person who lived in at a time and in a country that executed some of the worst (probably the worst) repressions of Christians in all history.  We might be more surprised still when we know more about the person who was the purported author of the text - Sergei Stragorodsky, a church leader whose path led him to be a missionary, a seminary rector, a progressive bishop ...and at the end of his life, Patriarch under Stalin. 

Sergei Stragorodsky

  For anyone who knew Sergei in the first decade of the 20th century (when he served for a time as Rector of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy) or in the second (when he led the Orthodox mission board, was made Archbishop and then Metropolitan), his declaration of 1927 would have been quite a surprise. His life reflects the tempestuous times - 

Konstantin Pobedonostev

 Sergei had served in Japan (becoming fluent in the language) in a period when the Russian Empire was trying to increase its influence in the Pacific region; after returning to Russia, he got involved in the most important cultural and political events of the day. He was one of the main initiators of a series of meetings between church leaders and the intelligentsia which strove to build bridges of understanding between the two groups (the "Religious-Philosophical Dialogs.") Those in the tsarist government who were responsible for the church (and most especially the reactionary Ober-Procurator, Konstantin Pobedonostsev) believed that any dialog with liberals (let alone compromise or reform) would be dangerous for both the state and for Orthodoxy, but Sergei consistently fought for renewal of the church. He was the major author of a 1904 request to the tsar that a synod of the Russian Orthodox Church be called as soon as possible in order to do away with the current system (under which the church was a part of state bureaucracy), and "demanded an immediate council of clergy and laity for the renewal and liberation of the whole church organism." Although Nicholas II said that he favored reform of the church, he constantly put off the synod until "calmer times." Because Nicholas' reign was anything but calm, the council was not called until after he had already abdicated the throne. During the years intervening years, Sergei became heavily involved with the planning of the first Synod of the Russian Orthodox church since the 17th century. Not only did he side with those who suggested significant changes in everyday life of the church (e.g., making Russian the primarily language of worship in the place of Old Church Slavonic), he also believed that the laity should have a major voice and vote in the decisions of the upcoming synod.

  After the Revolution these desires to bring about real reform in the church led him to participate in the council, which tried to carry out its business in the midst of the revolutionary chaos of 1917-18).  Though the council was not able to address many of the questions on its very wide agenda, it did manage to restore its pre-Petrine structures and elect a Patriarch (Tikhon). While this might seem to us to be a step backward toward the old ways, in fact it was a move intended to free the church from state attempts to control and limit its intended reforms. This was not enough for Sergei, though, and this led him to join, for a period of just over a year, a splinter group called the "Living Church." It appears that Sergei saw the enormous influence of a reactionary form of Orthodoxy taking hold in the official church and felt that the best way to move forward was to leave the Moscow Patriarchate. 
  But Sergei was sorely disappointed in his experience. There, together with sincere reformers, he found an even greater number of power-hungry and /or ignorant revolutionaries. The reformers fought among themselves, too, and splinter groups splintered even more. It also became clear fairly quickly that the Bolsheviks planned to use the “Living Church” and other groups as a way to “divide and conquer” Orthodoxy. Suffering complete disappointment, Sergei returned to his roots. By the autumn of 1923 he repented before Tikhon and was accepted back into the leadership of the Patriarchal church. 

Sergei and Patriarch Tikhon

  From this moment on, it seems, Sergei is convinced of the necessity to save the structures of the Moscow Patriarchate, and that unity among Orthodox Christians is essential for Christianity in Russia to survive. 
  And by this time, of course, there was a real question about whether or not Orthodoxy could survive. The Bolshevik regime was placing enormous pressure on the church, though it was not yet confident enough in its powers to start an all-out, frontal attack. Although you probably know this already, let me remind you a bit of the ways the Soviet leaders tried to destroy Christianity in the country from the time of the revolution until the end of the 1930s. 
  In 1918 Lenin issued an edict of separation of church and state. While this could be interpreted either as a step toward neutrality in regards to religion or even a positive thing, in fact it was meant to strip away the church's legal status and begin the process of taking away its material possessions. Throughout the 1920s various excuses were found by the government to repress the church – it was rich while the people were suffering from famine (in the Volga region 1921-22 and in the Ukraine and central Russia in the early 1930s), the church's precious medals were needed for state purposes, church leaders were involved in “anti-Soviet activities,” etc. During the early 1920s this was not a major priority of the government, but by the mid-20s there was a huge propaganda campaign organized against the church. In addition, it was at this time that clergy (and leaders in the hierarchy in particular) were being arrested. Between 1925 and 1927, 117 of the 160 bishops of the Moscow Patriarchy were in prison. 
  This was the church-wide context of Sergei's “Declaration of Loyalty.” But making the situation even more difficult was the fact that he himself had spent two terms in prison by this time, Patriarch Tikhon had passed away, and there was great confusion regarding who was now the legitimate leader of the Moscow Patriarchate. Sergei was one of the candidates for that position, and the government decided that it was with/through him that they would work. The secret police threaten Sergei, saying that they would arrest the rest of the bishops that remained free and would hand over congregations to splinter groups if there was no clear sign from the Moscow Patriarchate that they supported the Soviet government. Sergei took the hint and wrote and draft statement that he found to be an acceptable expression of the church's position to the state. In it he basically repeated the views of Patriarch Tikhon, that the church was “inherently neutral” in questions of politics. His draft was not accepted, however, and he was arrested once again. This time a draft was written for him (probably by the secret police), and Sergei eventually agreed to sign it and issue the text as the “Declaration of Loyalty.” 
  Sergei knew that by taking this step he would be condemned by many church leaders and also that there was a large chance that the government would not fulfill their promises of making life easier for Orthodox Christians (e.g., by allowing them to officially register as legal entities and by freeing arrested bishops) after the publication of the "Declaration." At the same time he felt that this was the best way to maintain the church and its structure - despite his earlier progressive stance, he was typically Orthodox in thinking that even bishops that were approved by the Soviet secret police were better than no bishops at all insofar as bishops guaranteed the survival of the church. In short, then, there doesn't seem to be much evidence of Sergei's personal ambition in issuing the "Declaration." Instead he was doing what he thought best for the survival of the church.

  Yet, there were no immediate positive affects for Orthodox believers after the publication of the "Declaration." In fact, the 1930s make the 20s look like child's play in regards to the repression of the church. At the beginning, the Bolsheviks believed that the church would collapse in on itself once the material possessions were gone. But neither that nor massive propaganda approved terribly effective in destroying the church. By the end of the 1920s, too, the government knew that its efforts with encouraging splinter groups were no longer productive, and that open repression of the church led believers to go "underground," and the "catacomb church" was more difficult to control. New efforts (starting in the 1920s but spreading in the 1930s) were directed at the repression of individual believers - people were kicked out of the party and then lost their jobs for perhaps baptizing a child or visiting the cemetery. New and enormous tax burdens were place on clergy. Not paying these taxes helped the government have an excuse for another and even more effective method of repression - to arrest local clergy (since Orthodox parishes functioned very poorly without a priest). According to the best statistics we have, in 1928 1500 were arrested; in 1929 - 3000; in 1930 -13,000; and in 1931-32 -19,000 more. As priests "disappeared" local officials found it much easier to close down parishes. By 1933 only around 20% of pre-Revolutionary churches were still open. In 1936 there seemed to be a new effort for the mass liquidation of all religions; the Stalinist regime tried to collapse ALL power into one place. Between 1918 and late 30s, approx. 42,000 Orthodox clerics were killed. But soon the wider political situation of the Soviet Union and its neighbors changed, and this had a large effect on the place of Orthodoxy in the country.
  During the 1930s, Sergei did the best he could to maintain a holding pattern, to somehow keep some sliver of church life alive. He also tried to distance himself from anti-Soviet agitation from Christian groups (including Orthodox Christian groups) abroad.  One of “his” most infamous acts of these years was a supposed interview with the western press in which he declared that there was no and never had been any repression of the church in Russia (this in response to the Pope's and the Archbishop of Canterbury's calls for Christian nations to stand up against Stalin's repression of the church). Only in the years since the fall of the Soviet Union has been possible to prove that these declaration were made in Sergei's name, but did not come from his hand – they were falsifications written by KGB agents, though Sergei had no way of bringing this fact to light without threatening his own position and the position of the church as a whole. 
  In addition Sergei tried to gain support among conservatives through taking the unusual step of condemning emigre theologian Sergei Bulgakov, whose theology of Divine Wisdom ("Sophiology") was the apogee of the movement known as the "Russian Religious Renaissance,"a movement that Sergei himself had been very close to in those long-past days of the early 20th century when he tried to build bridges between the church and educated society. Here Sergei, it seems, was overcompensating to prove his (capital and small "o") orthodoxy to those who condemned him for various reasons. In these years, it seemed that the only possible maneuvering for Sergei was to condemn those whom the Stalinist regime also found reason to condemn. 
  As I mentioned earlier, the situation changed for the Orthodox church only at the end of the 1930s, when new territories were added to the Soviet Union. This provoked a new religious policy on the part of Stalin insofar as he knew that in places like western Ukraine, outright attacks on religion would cause him many problems. This situation became even more intense after Nazi forces advanced and occupied former Soviet territories. There civilians could see a marked difference in the way the church was treated by the state, and this had a certain effect on morale. One example, from the Kiev region:

                                     1917   1940 (USSR) 1942 (Nazi occupation)
Churches                 1710       2                    318
Monasteries          23       0                       8
Priests                       1435     3                   437
Monks and nuns   5193       0                   387

Given this reality, Stalin eventually decided the church would be a useful instrument to improve the image of the Soviet government along the front lines of the war. 
  In addition, the Orthodox Church (under Sergei's active leadership) also proved to be a significance force in encouraging patriotic feelings in the country. On the day the Soviet Union was attacked, Sergei issued a statement calling all Orthodox believers to defend the homeland - "our Orthodox church has always shared the fate of the people. Together with the the people the church went through trials and was comforted by its successes. And the church will not leave the people even now. It blesses with a heavenly blessing the upcoming heroism of all the people." This time around, it wasn't a KGB statement, but his own personal initiative. He and the few other leading bishops left alive and free (a total of 4!) organized offerings to help pay for the war effort. Sergei petitioned Stalin to allow the Church to open a bank account for  donations as the church plans to finance the building of a division of tanks (40); Stalin agreed. This not only had the effect of drawing Stalin's attention to the potential usefulness of the church, it also de facto meant that the church could act as a legal entity (i.e., by having a bank account) for the first time in decades. The tone toward the church in the Soviet press changed almost immediately - there were now very few attacks on Orthodoxy.
  Sergei continued to support the war effort. A typical example - just after Novgorod was overrun by the Nazis, Sergei made an emotional appeal to the clergy of the Moscow region: "just recently in St. Sophia's Cathedral in Novgorod the Great, in a place where for almost a thousand years the Orthodox liturgy was celebrated, a Lutheran pastor has served [i.e., presided at the liturgy]. Let the same not be repeated here, in the heart of holy Rus." Sergei 

Artistic representation of St. Sophia's in the 1940s.

fails to mention two things: 1. there had been numerous Lutheran congregations in Novgorod, all of which were shut down by the Soviets 2. The Soviets had shut down St. Sophia's itself and turned it into an anti-religious museum in 1929.  Another example, from a statement issued in November 1942: "On this 25th anniversary of the Republic of the Soviets, in the name of our Clergy and of all the believers of the Russian Orthodox Church, faithful children of our Fatherland, I salute with cordiality and piety, in your person, the leader chosen by God [emphasis added], the leader of our military and cultural forces, who is guiding us to triumph over the barbarous invasion, to the prosperity of our country in peace, towards a radiant future for its peoples. May God bless by success and glory your valorous exploits for our Fatherland."
  At any rate it wasn't until 1942 that the regime began to openly acknowledge the Orthodox Church as a partner in the war effort. In that year permission to celebrate the Easter vigil in the capital was given for the first time. By the fall of 1943, Stalin was ready to "reward" the Orthodox church for its efforts, and the "directed rebirth" of the church began. On September 3, 1943, the three functioning Orthodox Metropolitans met with Stalin to determine the conditions of the church's new status, and a few days later church leaders met to officially elect Sergei as patriarch, more than 15 years after he took the reins of what was left of church administration. (Stalin was particularly open to allowing this to happen at this time since later that month a delegation from the Anglican Church would be visiting). The gathered clergy issued a statement - "We are deeply touched by the sympathetic relationship of our Leader of all the people - the Head of the Soviet government, J.V. Stalin - to the needs of the Russian Orthodox Church and to our humble efforts, ...we give our synod-wide thanks to the government."

  By early 1945 the number of active bishops had more than doubled, and there were more than 10000 functioning churches in the USSR (granted most were in the newly occupied territories, but there was a limited degree of church-openings in Russia proper as well). Over the next 10 years over 70 diocese were organized, dozens of monasteries were re-opened, tens of thousands of priests were able to serve, many of them after having studied in one of the newly-opened seminaries. The Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate came out regularly, and splinter groups from the Moscow Patriarchate were eliminated or driven underground. At the same time, everything that the official church did was carefully controlled; no bishops were appointed without KGB approval, and the church remained on very shaky legal ground. (There is one interesting story about the church's vulnerability in those days: Stalin asked - "Why don't you have enough personnel?" He knew perfectly well why - these people had been executed according to his orders in the preceding years. But Sergei found a different answer - "One of the reasons is that we prepare a priest [for service] and instead he becomes a Marshal of the Soviet Union."This was a not-so-veiled reference to Stalin himself, who as a young man had studied in seminary. Stalin apparently liked the answer and allowed the church to open up a theological institute in Moscow.)
  There are diametrically opposed interpretations of Sergei's actions as leader of the church. Some feel that he was a traitor to the faith, while others believe that all the compromises he made were worth it in order to guarantee the survival of the Russian Orthodox church. In any case it is clear that his leadership set the tone for the relationship between the church and the government until the end of the Soviet period.
  While it is outside of the realms of this meeting, those who are familiar with Russian history know that, while Sergei's experiences were extreme, they fall within the pattern of church/state relations established in Russia for many centuries. And while the Patriarchate could occasionally act as a force counter to the tsar in Russia's first Patriarchal period (as was the occasion, however rarely, in the Byzantine Empire from which Russia inherited its Eastern Christian tradition), after Peter the Great the Church was always at the mercy of the state. Patriarch Tikhon's attempt to establish the "inherently neutrality: of the church in the early Soviet period is outside of the tradition of Russian Christianity. And this was not just the position of politicians - as a rule church leaders have also believed that it is in the best interests of the faith to be close to those in power. 
  Knowing this history help us understand the life of the Russian Orthodox Church today. For example one can find a number of parallels between the path of Patriarch Sergei and the current Patriarch, Kirill. Both spent years serving the church abroad and did much to build bridges between the church and educated members of society. Both, after becoming the leader of the church, seemed to have found it necessary to “prove” their Orthodoxy. Both Sergei and Kirill were correct in their analysis that there was a danger of splinter groups forming on the “right wing” of the church. Sergei especially thought about the underground church, while Kirill had to deal with the effects of a situation that began shortly before his election – the activity of Bishop Diomid from Anadyr and Chukotka (Far East), who became a “non-commemorator,” i.e., he stopped praying for the Patriarch, because of the latter's “heretical” stance on certain issues (e.g., openness to dialog with other confessions.) And as Sergei was assisted by Stalin, the current Patriarch also receives much support from the country's most powerful leader, President Putin. It is not surprising that when a group like Pussy Riot comes along and aims their criticism directly at the heart of the the problem - the close relationship between the church and the state - the government takes swift and decisive action to silence them.  
  When we take this situation into account we can come to a better understanding of the barriers for reform in the Russian Orthodox Church today, as well as the difficulty it has in finding a critical, prophetic voice. The Lutheran Church in Russia comes from a similar background, and in some ways faces a similar challenge. At the same time, though, the utter lack of power of our church can be used for the sake of the Gospel – if other Christians find it hard to turn a critical eye toward the government and society, might we find the courage to step into that void?

More thoughts on the situation in Russia and Ukraine

Over the past few weeks I've been thinking a lot about how to understand recent events in Ukraine; even as I struggle to understand it myself, I also wanted to write something here that might give readers in the West some sort of parallel to help them understand the situation. Here's the best I've come up with so far:

Canadian Prime Minister Harper and acting Ukrainian leader Yatsenjuk.
This picture  inspired my far-fetched analogy comparing Canada and Ukraine.

Let's imagine for a moment that the government in Canada was suffering from a period of significant instability. For almost a decade the people had high hopes for the country's development, but were sorely disappointed by political leaders who were ineffective or corrupt. Protests began in Ottawa; tens of thousands demanded that the government resign. Some of the strongest voice of protest came from Quebec, where political leaders had decided to move away from the idea of independence and toward a re-visioning of Canada as a whole. After months of protest and confrontation with the government, the protesters took power. The country's new leaders said that the country's way forward was to emphasize Canada's independence (in terms of language, culture and economy) from the United States; there was great fear among English-speakers (especially in the western provinces) that they would be

repressed. The atmosphere was tense. And strange things started happening - crime was on the rise, militias started to take over government buildings, there were rumors that English would be banned and that U.S. military men were secretly working in the country.... Relatively quickly, politicians in British Columbia decided to separate from Canada. They organized a referendum, and many more voted for union with the U.S. than for remaining with Canada.

Now, if you imagine this situation and you're an American, how would you react? What should the U.S. do? It seems to me that many of us would surprise ourselves by saying that we should let B.C. in...and that we might be open to Alberta and Saskatchewan joining them, if that is the will of the people. 

It seems to me that if we use this (very far out) example, we can imagine, to a degree, why people in Russia are so overwhelmingly for annexing Crimea. They see that it is the will of the local people, and we are, after all, one people, with cultural differences that are really not any more significant than the differences within our own countries (e.g., the difference between Washington and Louisiana or Michigan and Hawaii...or, in Russia, between the Northern Caucasus region and Siberia or the Far North and Moscow.)

...and yet, there is another side to this story. What would happen if we were in the opposite position, if some territory wanted to leave the U.S.? Russia had that situation with Chechnya, and we know how Moscow reacted to that. And how would Washington (and probably most of the country) react if New Mexico voted to secede from the U.S. and join our neighbors to the south? They would be able to name lots of reasons to justify that action...but how would we feel about that? 

Europeans can probably imagine this situation even clearer. What if the enclave of Russia between Poland and Lithuania, Kaliningrad, voted to return to Germany, becoming Koenigsberg once again? And what if, on the other hand, Bavaria decided to go its separate way from Germany?

Estonian President Toomas Ilves recently said that the annexation of Crimea represents “a complete and utter collapse of the fundamental assumptions of security in the post-World War II order." If you're looking at this situation from the Baltic states (or perhaps even from Russia's other immediate neighbors) this situation is, truly, very troubling. And I understand that, even if I cannot pretend to understand really what Ukrainians must be feeling about the situation in Crimea. But what I would hope is that this reexamination of questions of security does not turn in to the West uniting to treat Russia as an enemy. Instead what needs to happen, from my point of view, is a new commitment on all sides to the rule of law in international affairs, to firm commitment to international agreements that favor the long-term and the common good over the short-term and national interests. It means remaining committed to democratic principles and democratic processes even if these are sometimes very inconvenient. 

The West has very little opportunity to effectively respond to the annexation of Crimea not because of questions related to military power, but because of a lack of moral authority. As Masha Lipman says in this article from the New Yorker: "Russia has become strong enough, Putin seems to suggest, to be as bad as the United States: to do as it pleases, to legitimate its aggression, and to act without a go-ahead from the U.N. And yet, at the same time, Putin claims that, unlike the United States, Russia does nothing wrong or lawless."

I believe that one of the reasons President Putin is sometimes shown in such negative light in the Western press is that he points out (with sharp wit, I might add) the hypocrisy of Western politicians when they condemn those who do not uphold human rights, etc. What he and his diplomats add, however, is a layer of cynicism to the whole question, an approach that seems to be reflected in Васька's comment on my last post below. Russians frequently say that democracy and the rhetoric of human rights are simply an ideological facade that allows the powerful to do what they want , when and where they want. Freedom, rule of law, and democratic structures (and independent judiciary and legislature, fair elections, etc.), this line of argument goes, are all illusions created by the powerful to control those who are weaker.  

And so in this situation, we have hypocrisy vs. cynicism, with the "little guys" (who are not so little! Ukraine is a big, populous and important country in Europe!) stuck in the middle, frequently suffering because of battles between the two. 

The question that many are asking now is - where does this stop? Is it possible that other territories in eastern Ukraine will want to join Russia? What would be Russia's reaction if they do? Will there be an echo effect around the globe, with new annexations taking place in areas of territorial dispute based on the principles of the right of local self-determination (+ a strong "friend" ready to take you in)? And will the West come to a reasonable conclusion about this situation - i.e., that we can no longer continue to demand that others hold to standards that we ourselves do not keep? 

As a Christian living in this country I cannot share the joy that many are feeling about the triumph of "historical justice." Although it could quite possibly be the case that Crimea will have a better chance to thrive as a part of Russia than it did as a part of Ukraine and while I'm sure that Moscow will pump billions of dollars in to supporting development in the region, this whole situation has already done so much to harm relationships between Russia and the West (not to mention Russia and Ukraine!) that it is hard to imagine an outcome that is positive overall. As I see it the Gospel call us to remove barriers between people; the upshot of these events will be more separation, more distrust, more (I'm sad to say) hate. 

If you're the praying kind, please keep the people of this region in your prayers. May God grant wisdom and compassion to all involved in order to reduce the chances of greater conflict.