Russian Orthodox Church Elects New Leadership - the effect on other Christian churches

Elected in the year before the fall of the Soviet Union, Patriarch Alexei II died on December 5th, 2008, after heading the Russian Orthodox Church for 18 years. Alexei, while born into an Orthodox family, had experience with other confessions from his youth - he was born in the capital of then-independent (and mostly Lutheran) Estonia, Tallinn, and spent many of his first years in church service in congregations in that country (by then already a part of the Soviet Union). Alexei rose quickly through the church hierarchy (something which at that time could only happen with the blessing of Soviet officials) and was an active participant in ecumenical affairs in the years before the fall of the Soviet Union. Alexei’s growing up in a predominately Lutheran country and his good relationship with former ELCROS Archbishop Kretschmar certainly contributed to the better-than-average relations between the two communions in Russia.
However, the 1990s showed a slow but consistent movement by the Orthodox church to hindering the work of other Christian confessions here, especially by influencing the laws of registration of religious groups and by attempting to gain a monopoly on the teaching of religion in schools. Granted, many groups deserved to be treated harshly - without seriously attempting to understand Eastern Christianity, it was dismissed as "not Biblical," and therefore no meaningful dialogue was possible. It was no surprise, then, that once elected Patriarch, Alexei did all he could to regain the church’s position in the country (and in the Orthodox world in general) after 70 years of repression. In this he no doubt had a great measure of success. Literally tens of thousands of congregations have been re-opened since the fall of the Soviet Union, and Alexei did much to organize the structures, funding, and educational programs that such restoration required. It is here, however, that there is the most room to criticize Alexei’s (and his successor's, Kirill's) legacy. The church clearly has business interests, though there is no transparency or financial accountability for them. Some have speculated about the wisdom of the symbiotic relationship between the church and the state that has developed in which the church is given access, influence and financial advantages by the while the church gives unquestioning support for government decisions (in particular during the two Chechen wars). In addition, Orthodoxy in Russia faces a challenge insofar as structures of the church are now so closely tied to the surrounding culture that in some ways they also reflect the weaknesses of the culture (for example, corruption).
The importance of Alexei for Russia can be seen by the reaction of the public to his death. Between eighty and one hundred thousand people lined up outside of the Church of Savior in Moscow to pay last respects to Alexei as he lay in state.
The Orthodox Church was fortunate to find a worthy successor of Alexei in Metropolitan Kirill. Kirill was well-known in Russia even before his election as Patriarch in the end of January - he was the Church’s media representative, and led a well-produced weekly program on state-run television. It was this program and some of the things Kirill had to say during its broadcast about other Christian groups that made many non-Orthodox Christians rather nervous when they heard, after Alexei's death, that Kirill was a leading candidate for the post. On the other hand, it also became clear as the months went past that Kirill was not from the "right-wing" of the church - not by far. A recently excommunicated Bishop in the Russian Far East was an example of a reactionary form of Orthodox (rather apocalyptic in character, very anti-ecumenical) that is relatively popular among "serious" believers.

Non-eastern Christians, then, can be glad that the council of the church elected a very talented new leader – a competent theologian, an able administrator, and a successful populizer of Russian Orthodox values in wider society. And while it is probably not realistic to hope for great gains in ecumenical dialogue under Kirill (despite his activity in ecumenical circles early in his career), the Orthodox Church under Kirill should at least have the resources to resist those elements within itself that would tear it out of dialogue with other churches. This gives us good reason to pray for this man, whose influence is great, that he might enable all Christians here to work for clear preaching of the Gospel of Jesus Christ in our words and in our deads.